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Summary  findings
Subnational governments are assuming greater fiscal  When central fiscal interventions are big enough, and
responsibility in many developing and transition  when a loss of local control  over the use of fiscal
countries. There is concern, however, that fiscal  resources is not too costly to local residents, local
decentralization may weaken fiscal discipline - that  decisionmakers will act to induce central government
local authorities may undertake  commitments or incur  bailouts, resulting in inefficient outcomes for the system
debt obligations that subsequently result in massive  as a whole.
central government support, in the form of extraordinary  This is not to say that fiscal decentralization produces
transfers, or "bailouts." (Recent experience in major U.S.  perverse incentives or requires central government
cities shows that these problems are not restricted to  control over local fiscal policies. But incentives for
developing countries.) Such bailouts could in turn cause  bailouts can be especially strong when local governments
national fiscal imbalances, excessive borrowing,  and  are considered "too big to fail" - for example, New
macroeconomic instability.  York, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC (in the United
Some analysts recomnmend  that central authorities  States) and Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (in Brazil). In
maintain strict control  over the fiscal behavior of lower-  such cases, the repercussions from major breakdowns in
level governments, but others argue that such controls  the provision of services - or in debt servicing - can be
could undercut the goals of fiscal decentralization,  too costly for central governments to ignore.
including autonomy.  Problems of fiscal discipline may result not because
Wildasin shows that central authorities may have  there is too much fiscal decentralization, says Wildasin,
strong incentives to prop up the finances of local  but because there is too little. It may make sense to carry
governments when the public services provided locally  out more thorough decentralization - for example,
benefit the rest of society. The prospect of such  devolving fiscal authorities to smaller jurisdictions or
interventions may in turn create incentives for localities  special-purpose functional units, or subdividing large
to underprovide  services that produce substantial  subnational jurisdictions into many smaller units.
spillover benefits, using local resources instead for
purposes that may benefit local constituencies but not
nonresidents.
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Nashville, TN  37235
USAIIt  is hereby  declared to  be  a  public policy of the  Commonwealth ...  to foster the  fiscal
integrity of cities of the first class to assure that these cities provide for the health, safety, and
welfare of their  citizens; pay principal and interest owed on their debt obligations when due;
meet financial obligations to their employees, vendors, and suppliers; and provide for proper
financial planning procedures and budgeting practices. The inability of a city of the first class
to provide essential services to its citizens as a result of a fiscal  emergency is hereby determined
to affect adversely the health, safety, and welfare not only of the citizens of that  municipality
but also of other citizens in this Commonwealth.*
Mayor Marion Barry ... opposed the efforts of a member of Congress to provide $42 million
to the D.C. police department.  He said it would be unfair to single out the police department
for additional funds when all city agencies are in financial straits.t
I.  Introduction
In  established  federations  such  as  the  United  States  and  Canada,  lower-level govern-
ments  - states,  provinces,  or  municipalities  - occasionally  fall into  serious  fiscal crises  in
which  expenditures  are  drastically  out  of balance  with  current  and  projected  revenues,  re-
sulting  in loss of access to  the  capital  market  and  the prospect  large  and  sudden  reductions
in service  provision  and  employment  or  increases  in local  taxes.  Such  crises are  relatively
rare,  but  when they  do occur,  higher-level  governments  may intervene  in the  fiscal manage-
ment  of major  cities, such as New York in the  1970s, or Washington,  D.C. and  Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania  at  present.  These  interventions  often involve the  establishment  of boards  or
commissions  especially  appointed  for the  task,  possibly endowed with exceptional  authority
to  cut  spending,  insure  the  continued  provision  of essential  services,  or  fire,  furlough,  or
reassign  public-sector  workers  (Noto  and  Rymarowicz  [1995]).
In  many  developing  countries  or in the  transition  economies,  subnational  government
fiscal  crises seem  be  much  more  commonplace.  A  thorough  discussion  of  the  experience
of these  countries  goes beyond  the  scope of  the  present  essay, but  a brief  review  of a few
important  cases will help  to  reveal  the  nature  and  importance  of the  issue throughout  the
world.  (See Wildasin  [forthcoming]  for further  discussion  and  references.)  In  China,  fiscal
decentralization  has  accompanied  the  general  economic  decentralization  of the  past  decade
of economic reform.  The entire fiscal system, including  the tax  system,  the  assignment  of ex-
penditure  functions  among levels of government,  and the structure  of intergovernmental  fiscal
relations,  has  been in a state  of flux.  The central  government  allocates  significant  amounts
*  Pennsylvania  Intergovernmental  Cooperation  Authority  Act for Cities of the First  Class,
Laws of  Pennsylvania,  Act  1991-6, Session of  1991, Section  102.  "Cities  of the  first  class"
in Pennsylvania  are those  with  populations  in excess of 1.5 million.  Philadelphia  is the  only
city in this  class; the  second largest  city in the  state  is Pittsburgh,  with  a population  of less
than  .4 million.
t  "As D.C. Police Struggle  On, Change  Pays Off in New York" by R.  Castaneda  (pp, Al,
A8),  The  Washington  Post,  Mar.  30,  1996.
1of resources  to  lower-level governments  through  intergovernmental  grants.  Competing  de-
mands  by  regional  authorities  for additional  fiscal assistance  from  the  central  government
have  even led  to  use  of  "loans"  from  the  central  bank  to lower-level governments,  leading
to expansion  of the  money  supply  and,  in effect, to direct  inflationary  finance  of lower-level
governments  (The  World  Bank,  1995a).  In India,  the  other  giant  of the  developing  world,
a number  of state  governments  are in fiscal crisis, accumulating  significant  liabilities  to the
central  authorities  in the  form of intergovernmental  borrowing  (The  World Bank,  1995b).
Intergovernmental  fiscal relations  in several  Latin  American  countries such as Argentina
and  Brazil  are  similarly  characterized  by  problems  of financial  solvency  for state  or  local
governments  leading  to  stopgap  lending  or  grants  from  higher-level  governments.  In  the
Brazilian  case, for example,  a number  of the  country's  major  commercial  banks  are owned
by  state  governments,  and  the  states  themselves  have borrowed  heavily  from  these  banks
to  finance  their  public  expenditures.  The  magnitude  of this  indebtedness  is large and  has
grown rapidly  (from about  US $57 billion in  1991 to about  US $110 billion  in  1995, which
may  be  compared  to  Brazil's  total  external  debt  in  1991 of about  US $120 billion).  In  the
face of higher  real  interest  rates,  some  states  (notably  Sao  Paulo,  whose debt  amounts  to
almost half of all state  government  debt  in Brazil) have stopped  servicing their  debt,  pushing
these  major  banks  into financial  insolvency.  In  order  to avoid a general  financial  crisis, the
central  bank  of Brazil  is assuming  control  of these banks  and,  in the  process,  may  end  up
absorbing  large  amounts  of state  government  debt.  In effect,  then,  the  fiscal crises of some
state  governments  (particularly  the  larger  and  more  prosperous  states  such  as  Sao  Paulo
and  Rio  de  Janeiro)  will have  been  resolved  through  special  (and  far  from  transparent)
interventions  by central  monetary  and  fiscal authorities.
In  Russia,  as  in  China,  economic  and  political  reforms  coupled  with  strong  regional
tensions have resulted  in a major  restructuring  of fiscal systems,  including the fiscal relations
among governments.  Here, too,  the central  government has been unsuccessful  in establishing
an orderly  and  enforceable  system for allocation  of fiscal resources  between  the  central  and
lower-level governments;  indeed,  in circumstances  reminiscent  of the  United  States  under
the Articles of Confederation  (and of the Soviet Union prior  to its collapse:  Bahl and Wallich
[1995], McLure  et  al.  [1995]), regional  governments  have  unilaterally  withheld  all or  part
of the  taxes  collected  in their  territories,  even when specified  shares  of these revenues  are
supposed  to  flow to the  central  government  (The  World Bank  [1996a, b]).
The  examples  of these  and  other  countries  raise doubts  about  the  appropriateness  and
viability  of fiscal decentralization,  especially in developing and  transition  economies.  Lower-
level governments  seem  to find  themselves  in recurring  fiscal crises that  necessitate,  or  at
least  elicit,  ad  hoc  interventions  by  central  governments.  "Fiscal  discipline"  or  "hard"
budget  constraints  appear  to be lacking, and inefficient, inequitable  and simply chaotic public
policies may  result.  Unanticipated  transfers  from  central  governments  or central  banks  to
lower-level governments  may undermine  macroeconomic  and price  stability.  Although  fiscal
decentralization  has  played  a  critical  role  in  the  reform  of the  public  sector  throughout
2the world in recent years, it might be desirable to reverse this trend  if it contributes to
dysfunctional fiscal performance. Indeed, some analysts and policy  advisers (e.g., Bird et al.
[1995],  Prud'homme [1995],  Tanzi [1996])  recommend  re-establishment  of central government
control of the  fiscal affairs of lower-level  governments through limitations on their fiscal
autonomy (e.g., constraints on  local borrowing authority) or through reversals of recent
fiscal decentralization initiatives. As is widely appreciated by those involved  in this debate,
however,  the stakes are high. Retrenchment of central planning and fiscal controls is, after
all, a major element in the process  of economic  liberalization  that has characterized  economic
and political reforms in many countries in recent years, and many would hesitate to sacrifice
the potential benefits of the transition to greater economic  and political decentralization of
which fiscal decentralization is a part.  1
In a policy context, it is possible and probably desirable to  argue that  ad hoc fiscal
relations between governments  characterized by bailouts and soft budget constraints ought to
be avoided and that these relations ought to be characterized  by transparency, accountability,
and predictability. While the value of normative policy advocacy or "moral suasion" should
not be underestimated, it is also useful to try to ascertain what institutional structures or
fundamental economic  conditions may or may not be conducive  to desired policy  outcomes. 2
Indeed, since issues of fiscal  decentralization and intergovernmental  fiscal  relations are often
settled, in significant part,  through the formal mechanism of written constitutions, it seem
especially appropriate to analyze them from the  "constitutional" perspective of the public
choice school, which views the  actual realizations of policy as the  equilibrium outcome
of an institutional  framework for public sector decisionmaking. Exhortations by  policy
advisers to  change soft budget  constraints into hard  ones are ultimately likely to  be of
limited effectiveness  if institutions are structured  in such a way that  policymakers find ad
hoc fiscal  interventions to be irresistibly attractive.  What institutional or other factors drive
policymakers  to soften budget constraints in some cases and enable them to resist pressures
1 For further  discussion  of recent trends toward fiscal decentralization in Europe, Latin
America, China, and elsewhere,  and of the policy debates surrounding these trends, see Bird
1994)  , the InterAmerican Development Bank (1994), Owens and Panella (1991), and Roy
1995)  in addition to the sources cited above. Ter-Minasian (1996) reviews the institutions
and  experience of subnational borrowing for several developed and  developing countries,
finding  that market discipline  helps to establish  incentives  for effective  borrowing  in countries
with well-developed  financial markets but administrative controls or rules imposed by higher-
level authorities may be needed to constrain local borrowing.
2  For example, Ter-Minasian (1996, p. 16) notes: "In countries with a history of bailouts
of insolvent subnational governments by the central government, a firm and sustained re-
f-  o engage in further operations of this kind will be necessary to change expectations
and behaviors of market participants." Similarly,  Tanzi (1996, p.  310) writes that  "decen-
tralization will contribute to macroeconomic  stability ... as long as all these possibilities [of
subnational borrowing]  exist, as long as there is the belief that the central government will
honor subnational governments' obligations, and as long as the incentives  for these govern-
ments encourage higher spending." While these remarks suggest that  central governments
have it within their power to avoid adverse  fiscal outcomes by acting firmly with respect to
subnational governments, they also suggest that  central governments  have often chosen not
to act in that way. What, then, can be done to change the nature of the process that  leads
central and subnational governments  to act in ways  that  lead to adverse outcomes?
3for bailouts in other cases?
No simple economic analysis can hope to address every important aspect of this very
complicated issue.  When considering the fiscal crises of major American cities like New
York, Washington, DC, or Philadelphia, Brazilian states like Sao Paulo, or Indian states like
Orissa, it is natural to look for specific triggering events such as high unemployment rates,
fluctuations in real interest rates, the flight of tax bases from central cities to suburbs, or
corrupt political administrations. 3  When attempting to model the fiscal relations between
central and lower-level  governments,  it is natural to think of "bailouts" as stages in a repeated
game, and to think of central governments  as facing a tradeoff between beneficial short-run
interventions and long-run reputation  and  incentives, rather  like creditors in  private or
international capital markets or like central bankers concerned with market expectations.
These considerations are very likely to be crucial elements of the  complete story of soft
budget constraints for lower-level  governments.  4
The present paper, however,  offers a somewhat different perspective on the problem of
soft budget constraints. It may be motivated by asking  why some lower-level  governments  fall
into fiscal crises that seem to require interventions by higher-level  governments  while others
do not.  For instance, in the United States, there are many thousands of local governments;
they vary widely in size, function, and  administrative organization and  serve regions of
extremely diverse demographic and economic composition and circumstances.  Typically,
a large share of the expenditures of these localities is financed or subsidized by transfers
from higher-levei  governments which may be explicit (grants) or implicit (Federal income-
tax deductibility of many local taxes).  However,  these transfers are systematic in nature
and  are not triggered by the fiscal crises of individual localities.  Most localities do not
face problems in servicing their debt, do not receive special infusions of funds from state
See Inman (1995) for a clear discussion  of the Philadelphia case.
4  A series of recent contributions investigate how soft budget constraints rise for state-
owned enterprises and how decentralization of capital-market institutions may harden their
constraints; see, e.g., Qian (1994), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995),  and von  Thadden (1995).
In a somewhat similar vein, Cremer (1995) emphasizes  that  restriction of information flows
between principals and agents, such as might result from vertical disintegration or greater
decentralization of borrower-lender  relationships, may enable principals to discipline agents
more credibly. What might be called "trapped creditors" play an important  role in some
of these analysis, that  is, lenders who have already invested some capital in a project and
who, in the face of these sunk costs, may decide to invest still a bit more in a bad project
in order to see it through to completion, even though they would have chosen to avoid it
ex ante. There are undoubtedly useful applications or variations of these ideas that  could
(and, in future  research, should) be developed in the setting of intergovernmental fiscal
relations.  The approach taken here, however, is basically different in its emphasis on the
role of interjurisdictional externalities as a contributing factor to soft budget constraints. By
analogy to trapped creditors, the model developed below relies on intrinsic externalities to
forge a linkage between any one lower-level  jurisdiction and the rest of the economy which,
in a  sense, may  "trap" the  rest of the economy into having an interest in the  decisions
made within a locality. As Qian (1994) observes, although "paternalism" plays a significant
role in the writings of Kornai (1986) on soft budget constraints, this concept has no obvious
counterpart in pure investment models. The externalities that appear in the present analysis
may capture something of the "paternalistic" argument.
4legislatures  and  do not fall under  the jurisdiction  of state-appointed  financial  control  boards.
These  elementary  observations  shows that  fiscal decentralization  need not,  in and  of itself,
give rise  to recurring  fiscal crises,  soft budget  constraints,  or bailouts.
Indeed,  fiscal decentralization  might  actually  make soft  budget  constraints  less rather
than  more  likely.  Informally  speaking,  one  can  imagine  a  continuum  of economic  and  po-
litical  organizational  forms representing  varying degrees of centralization.  Completely  cen-
tralized  government  (perhaps  even at  the  world level) would represent  one  extreme  of this
continuum.  Moving successively toward  greater  decentralization  along this  continuum,  one
would encounter  state  and  provincial  governments,  general-purpose  local governments  such
as counties  or municipalities,  and special-purpose  local governments  such as school districts,
or water  authorities.  Entities  of still smaller  geographical  scope and  greater  functional  spe-
cialization  lie still further  in the  direction  of increased decentralization,  gradually  crossing a
rather  diffuse boundary  between  the public  and the  private  sector.  For instance,  local refuse
collection  may  be  contracted  out  by local  governments  to  private  companies;  zoning  and
other  land-use  controls  provide  very limited  and  specific local public  constraints  on uses  of
land  which remains fundamentally  under  the  control of private  agents.  Public,  quasi-private
and  private  services  may  exist  side-by-side  in  this  part  of the  continuum,  as often  occurs
with  recreational  and  sports  facilities  or for-profit,  not-for-profit,  and  public  hospitals.  At
the  complete decentralization  extreme  of the  continuum  are individual  firms and  households
in their  private  spheres of activity.  In a mixed economy, some economic activity  is organized
by entities  at  almost every  point  along this  continuum,  and  each such entity  normally  faces
formal constraints  on its  financial  flows. As one moves along this  continuum,  is it really the
case that  greater  decentralization  leads to softer  budget  constraints?  Central  governments
typically  exert  less direct  financial  control  over local  governments  than  state  or provincial
governments  and still less control  over individual  households  and firms, but this  control  does
not  seem essential  to establish  fiscal or market  discipline  over very decentralized  activities.
Is it possible that  the  fiscal crises observed  in some countries  could be the  result  of too little
decentralization  rather  than  too much  decentralization?
The  present  essay  attempts  to  shed  light  on  these  issues by  developing  a  model  of
interactions  between  central  and  lower-level governments  in  which  there  is  a  meaningful
distinction  between  "hard"  and  "soft"  budget  constraints  and  in  which  it  is possible  to
identify  conditions  likely to result  in one or the  other.  Of course, the mere fact that  the fiscal
affairs of higher-  and lower- level governments  are interrelated,  for instance  by fiscal transfers
from the  center to lower-level governments,  does not imply that  lower-level governments  face
"soft"  budget  constraints.  The  budget  constraints  facing  lower-level governments  may  be
altered  by  central  government  policies such  as fiscal transfers  but  as  long as  the  transfer
recipients  perceive  these  constraints  to  be  binding  it  is  natural  to  characterize  them  as
"hard."  The  notion  of  a  "soft"  budget  constraint  is that  circumstances  may  transpire  in
which the budget  constraint  facing a locality  5  is altered  in some contingent  fashion allowing
5  For ease of reference, lower-level governments  will often be referred  to below as  "locali-
5an  outcome  to  occur  which  would not  have  been  attainable  under  the  "normal",  "initial",
or  "announced"  constraint.  The term  "bailout"  may  be  apt  in this  context;  "receivership"
is another  term  that  seems to  capture  part  of the  flavor of the  phenomenon.  In general,  the
fiscal crises of lower-level governments  seem to give rise  to varying  combinations  of added
central  government  control  (loss of local  "autonomy")  and  added  fiscal assistance  to  local
governments  ("bailouts"),  and the  model presented  here provides  a framework  within which
these elements  are clearly  revealed.
A first  basic  premise  of the  model  is that  the  fiscal  affairs  of an  individual  locality
are  not  a  matter  of indifference  to  the  "central  government",  interpreted  here  as  an  agent
representing  the  interests  of  the  country  as a  whole  and  thus  of those  who  reside  outside
of the  given  locality.  Formally,  it  is assumed  that  local  governments  provide  public  goods
which  not  only benefit  their  own residents  but  that  produce  external  benefits for residents
of other  localities  as  well.  Because  of these  externalities,  the  central  government,  acting
in  the  interest  of  the  whole  society,  may  (and,  in the  model,  does)  establish  programs  of
intergovernmental  transfers  that  function  as Pigovian  corrective  subsidies.  A second  basic
premise  of the  model,  however,  is that  there  is a  sequential  structure  to  decisionmaking.
The  center  moves first  in establishing  a  program  of corrective  intergovernmental  transfers.
This  policy  establishes  a putative  budget  constraint  for localities,  which then  choose their
levels of local taxes and expenditures.  The story  does not  end there,  however.  In particular,
the  center  can move last,  after  observing  local fiscal decisions, by taking  direct  control  over
local expenditures  and  by financing  incremental  local spending  from central  funds.  It  is this
third-stage  fiscal intervention  by  the  center  which  corresponds  to a  "bailout"  and  which, if
it occurs,  reveals  the local  government  budget  constraint  to have been  "soft."
A major  goal  of the  analysis  is to identify  the  conditions  under  which  the  center  does
or does not intervene  at  the  third  stage.  Section II presents  the  basic structure  of the  model
and  recapitulates  some  of the  standard  principles  of  intergovernmental  fiscal  relations  in
the  presence  of  interjurisdictional  externalities,  Section  III  models  the  use  of bailouts  by
the  central  government.  It shows that  the  externalities  generated  by local public  goods may
make such interventions  attractive  from the viewpoint of the rest  of society, but that  there are
also conditions  under which the center  would not intervene,  in which case localities definitely
face hard  budget  constraints.  The  analysis  in Section  III  also indicates  that  the  hardness
of local budget  constraints  is partly  in the  hands  of the  localities  themselves.  In particular,
there  are conditions  under  which localities  could take actions  that  would elicit bailouts  from
the  center,  but  in which  the  payoff to local  residents  in the  event  of a bailout  is sufficiently
unattractive  that  the  locality  does  not  act in such  a way as to  trigger  central  intervention
in the  third  stage.  In  this  case, too,  the  local  budget  constraint  is hard  in the  sense that  a
third-stage  intervention  would not  be observed, highlighting  the fact  that  bailouts  and  soft
budget  constraints  emerge from  the  actions  of both  central  and  local governments.
ties,"  but  this  term should be understood  to embrace jurisdictions  such as states  or provinces
as well.
6The  model  is highly  stylized  in  order  to  bring  out  clearly  some  basic  insights,  and
one  aspect  of this  stylization  is the  assumption  that  all localities  are  of identical  size, i.e.,
they  contain  equal numbers  of residents.  Given a  fixed national  population  size, the  size of
local government  can be taken  as a parameterization  of the  degree of fiscal decentralization:
when the national  population  is divided into only a few large jurisdictions,  the  degree of fiscal
decentralization  is low, while a high degree of decentralization  is represented  in the model by
small and  numerous  jurisdictions.  Recalling  the  notion  of a centralization/decentralization
continuum  mentioned  earlier,  it is natural  to ask how jurisdictional  size affects the  hardness
of local  budget  constraints.  Section  IV  addresses  this  issue by  carrying  out  comparative
statics  analysis of the effect of jurisdictional  size on the willingness of the central  government
to  intervene  in local  fiscal affairs and  on the  incentives  that  localities  have to  induce  such
interventions.  It  is necessary  to  impose additional  structure  on the  model in order  to make
this  analysis  tractable,  but,  subject  to the limitations  of additional  simplifying assumptions,
the  analysis  indicates  that  budget  constraint  do  indeed  tend  to  be soft  for large  localities
and  hard  for small ones.
Section  V discusses some of the  policy implications  of the  analysis  and  identifies  direc-
tions  for further  research.
IL  Local  Public  Good  Provision,  Spillovers,  and  Intergovernmental  Grants
A.  The  Basic  Model
Household  Preferences,  Endowments,  and Externalities.  Suppose  that  the  total  popu-
lation  in the  economy  is N.  In  order  to simplify  the  notation  and  in order  to demonstrate
that  the  results  do not  depend  on  asymmetries  in household  attributes,  all households  are
assumed  to  have identical  preferences  and  endowments.  Each household  directly  consumes
three  commodities,  x, z and  G.  The first is interpreted  as an  all-purpose  private  good which
will serve  as num6raire.  Each  household  is endowed with  w units  of this  commodity.  Con-
sumption  of the  second good, which may be thought  of as health,  water,  or education,  yields
external  benefits  to other  households.  The third  commodity,  G, is a  Samuelson public  good
whose level of provision,  as described  below, is determined  by a central  government.
The external  effects associated  with  consumption  of good  z creates  an interdependency
among  households  which is crucial  in the  following analysis.  The  precise  structure  of these
external  effects could  take  various  forms  without  affecting the  results  substantially.  How-
ever, given  the  intended  applications,  it is desirable  for this  structure  to incorporate  three
elements.  (i)  External  effects  should  be  to  some  degree additive  and  anonymous.  Each
household  may  care about  the  total  number  of vaccinations  given to other  households  (the
total  number  of households  with  access to potable  water,  the  total  basic literacy  rate),  etc.,
but  may be more or less indifferent  as to exactly  which households obtain  the  vaccination;  in
other  words, any one household's  preferences exhibit  a high degree of substitutability  in the
external  benefits  generated  by other  households'  consumption  of good  z.  (ii)  The  external
7effects associated  with  any  one household's  consumption  of good  z should  be  characterized
by diminishing  returns.  While  there  may be  a large external  effect associated  with  meeting
"basic needs",  such  as  vaccinations  for communicable  disease  (installation  of standpipes,
basic literacy,  etc.),  the  external  benefits  associated  with  treatment  of injuries  (residential
water  hookups,  secondary  education)  may  be  much  smaller,  while cosmetic  surgery  (avail-
ability of water for watering  of lawns, some forms  of university  education)  may yield almost
no external  benefit  at  all. Thus,  in particular,  a given amount  of resources  spent  on health
care (water  supply,  education)  will produce  more  external  benefits if distributed  relatively
equally  among  the  population.  (iii) Household  preferences  should be  characterized  by a di-
minishing  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  external  benefits  and  consumption  of other
goods,  i.e., a household's  marginal  willingness to pay  for the  health  care (water  availability,
education)  of others  diminishes  as their  consumption  level rises.
To capture  these  features,  suppose  that  each household  h has  a strictly  quasi-concave
utility  function  U(Xh,  Zh,  Z, G) where  Z - h'  /(Zh'),  with  d'  >  0 >  Y".  Here,  (Xh,  Zh)  iS
household  h's own-consumption  of goods x and  z; the third  argument  of the  utility  function,
Z,  reflects  the  external  benefit  to  h of the  consumption  of good  z  by other  households.  6
The  concavity of the function  ,B  reflects the  "basic need" aspect  of the  external  effects (item
(ii)  above).  The  fact  that  the  external  effects are  summed  across households  reflects  the
substitutability  of the  externalities  produced  by different  households  (item  (i)).  The  strict
quasi-concavity  of  u(.)  reflects  the  diminishing  marginal  returns  to  aggregate  externalities
(item  (iii)).  It  is also assumed  that  no goods  are inferior.
Government  structure,  technology, and  finance.  There  is a fixed total  population  N  and
a  single central  government.  The  population  is partitioned  into  local jurisdictions  which,
for the  sake of notational  simplicity, are  assumed  all to  contain  the  same number  of house-
holds,  n;  households  are  immobile  among  jurisdictions.  Since  the  analysis  focuses  on  the
relationship  between  a single jurisdiction  and  the  central  government,  the  assumption  that
all localities  are  of the  same size is not  critical,  but  this  and  other  symmetry  assumptions
simplify  the  notation  and  exposition.  7  Each  locality  determines  a  level of  good  z  to  be
provided  to each of its  residents,  i.e., z is treated  as a local public good.  In this  and  the next
section,  all of the  analysis  is based on the  assumption  of an  exogenously-fixed  size for local
jurisdictions,  and  the  extent  to which the  cost of provision of good z depends  on population
size - i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  this  good  is subject  to  crowding  or  congestion  effects - is
therefore  irrelevant.  Section IV, however, is devoted to an  analysis  of the  effects of jurisdic-
tional  size, and  for the  purposes  of that  analysis  it is useful  to  abstract  from  economies  or
6  Since it  eases  the  notation  slightly  to  do so,  household  h's  own  consumption  of good
z  is assumed  to contribute  a term  P(Zh)  to  the  summation  over h'  in the  utility  function.
This assumption  is inconsequential  for the  analysis,  however.
7  The  total  number  of localities  in the  economy, N/n  might  not  be  an integer.  Since the
basic analysis  applies even with  asymmetric  jurisdictions,  however, any departures  from  an
integer  number  of localities  could  be accommodated  by allowing for a  "remainder"  locality
of size N  mod  n.
8diseconomies  of scale in the  provision  of the  local  public  good  so that  the  effects of juris-
dictional  size in the  analysis  are  "uncontaminated"  by technological  considerations.  For the
sake of notational  economy and  consistency,  therefore, let us assume  at the  outset  that  z is a
"quasi-private"  local public  good, that  is, the total  cost of providing  a given number  of units
of the  good to each of a jurisdiction's  residents is proportional  to the  number  of households
residing  in locality.  For simplicity,  units  are chosen so that  each unit  of this  good has a cost
of 1.  The  total  cost of providing  each resident  in a locality  with  z units  of the  good  is thus
nz.  8
In  order  to  abstract  from  the  complications  associated  with  distortionary  taxation,  all
localities  and  the  central  government  are assumed  to have uniform  lump-sum  taxes  at  their
disposal  to finance  their  expenditures.  Local public good  provision  may  be paid  for either
from  local  taxes  or  with  grants  from  the  central  to  local governments.  The  role of grants
in the  analysis  will be  to  affect the  level of local provision  of a  good,  namely  good  z, that
generates  spillover benefits  for the  rest  of the society.  As is customary  in the  literature,  two
types  of grant  instruments  are  considered:  lump-sum  and  matching  conditional  grants.  Let
m denote share  of local expenditures  reimbursed  by the  center  through  matching  grants;  on
the grounds  of symmetry,  the  matching  rate  is assumed  to be  the same for all localities.  Let
gi denote  any  lump-sum  grant  from  the  center  to locality  i,  expressed  in per  capita  terms.
Although  this  lump-sum  grant  may be  uniform  across localities,  the  notation  distinguishes
the  lump-sum  grant  level by locality  because,  as will become clear, we want  to consider  the
possibility  that  the  center  may use lump-sum grants  to intervene  specifically in the financing
of local public  good provision  in a particular  locality.  Let  c, be  the  per-capita  level of local
"own-contributions"  to the  provision  of the  local  public  good  in locality  i,  i.e., ci  denotes
the  amount  paid  in local  taxes  paid  by each  resident  of the  locality.  For  the  purposes  of
the  discussion in the  present  section,  it is assumed  that  matching  and  lump-sum  grants  are
not used  in conjunction  with  one another.  The level of local public  good consumed  by each
resident  of locality  i is therefore
zi =  ci + gi  (1L)
when the  central  government  provides  lump-sum  grants  or
Zi =  Ci/(-  m)  (1M)
8  It  is certainly  reasonable  to  ask  why  quasi-private  goods should  be  provided  through
the public  sector.  One possible  explanation  is that  for some goods and in some institutional
contexts  (e.g., under  court decrees about  educational  access), it may be infeasible to exclude
consumers  on the  basis of price.  It  is not the  purpose  of the  present  discussion,  however, to
evaluate  the  normative  justification  for public provision of quasi-private  local public  goods.
Rather,  let  us  merely  observe  that  many  of  the  goods  provided  by  local  governments  -
education  is an obvious example  - are certainly  congestible and  that  the  cost of provision  is
indeed roughly  proportional  to jurisdictional  size once minimum  efficient scale  is achieved.
The  case of quasi-private  local public goods is therefore  empirically  relevant.  As noted,  it is
also analytically  helpful  since it means that  the  results  of Section IV do not  depend  on the
presence or  absence of scale effects in local public good  provision.  The implications  of scale
economies  for the  issue of optimal  jurisdiction  size are  discussed briefly in the  conclusion.
9under  matching  grants.  Letting  T  denote  the  amount  of central  government  lump-sum  tax
imposed  on  each household,  the  level of good  x consumed  by a resident  of locality  i is the
level of endowment  net  of local and  central  government  taxes,  i.e.,
xi  =  W  c  - T.  (2)
The menu  of bundles of local private  and public good consumption  available to residents
of locality  i must  therefore  satisfy  the  budget  constraint
xi+zi  =w-T+gi  zi > gi  (3L)
when lump-sum  grants  are  used  (the  inequality  in (3L) reflects  the  fact  that  the  grants  are
conditional  in nature)  or
xi + (1-m)zi  = w-T  (3M)
if matching  grants  are used.  The  constraints  (3L) and  (3M) combine  the  household  budget
constraints  (2) and  the  local government  budget  constraints  (1L) and  (IM)  by elimination
of the  local own-contribution  variable  ci. Note  that  lump-sum  grants  act like a pure  income
transfer  to the  residents  of  a  locality, whereas  matching  grants  lower the  relative  price  of
the  local  public  good.
A  system  of grants  and  central  government  taxation  is feasible  only if it  satisfies  the
central  government  budget  constraint.  Summing  total  fiscal transfers  across all localities  i,
this  constraint  takes the  form
Engi  + G = NT  (4L)
under  lump-sum  grants  and
mlE  nzi + G = NT  (4M)
under  matching  grants.
B.  Grants  and Efficiency  with  Hard  Budget  Constraints
The  standard  normative  theory  of intergovernmental  grants  in  the  presence  of  inter-
jurisdictional  externalities  applies  the  principles  of Pigovian  welfare economics  to intergov-
ernmental  fiscal relations  (Oates  [1972]).  Localities  are  treated  like households  that  opti-
mize  subject  to  their  budget  constraints.  If local  public  goods  produce  spillover  benefits,
equilibrium  allocations  will be  inefficient  in the  absence  of interventions  by  a  higher-level
government  since each  locality  ignores  the  external  benefits  of its  expenditures.  Matching
grants  lower the  relative  price  of local  public  expenditures  and  can  be  used  as  Pigovian
corrective  subsidies to  induce efficient local  spending.  The  model presented  above has  been
deliberately  structured  to  conform  to  the  basic  suppositions  of this  standard  theory,  and
a concise formal  restatement  of the  essential  elements  of the  theory  is useful  as  a  point  of
reference for the  analysis  to follow.
10Equilibrium.  First,  since the  residents  of each  locality  are  identical,  it  is natural  to
assume  that  local policies are chosen to maximize  the  welfare of these residents,  a behavioral
hypothesis  that  it is compatible  with simple majority  voting or other plausible  public  choice
mechanisms.  Each locality is assumed  to take  as parametrically-given  the fiscal instruments
of the  central  government,  a critical  assumption  that  is reconsidered  in Section III.  Because
of spillover effects, the  most-preferred  level of local public good provision in any  one locality
depends  on  the  level  of  provision  undertaken  by  other  localities,  giving  rise  to  strategic
interactions  among  local jurisdictions.  It  is customary  to suppose  that  localities  achieve a
Nash non-cooperative  equilibrium  in levels of local public  good provision.  9  Provided  that
grant  policy  treats  all localities  uniformly, the  simplifying  assumptions  of the  model  make
it natural  to  focus on  symmetric  Nash equilibria.  To define such  an  equilibrium  formally,
let z  denote  the  per  capita  level of z provided  to the  residents  of all localities  other  than  i.
Locality  i is assumed  to solve the  problem
(P)  mar<x,,z,>  u(xi,  zi, (N  - n),(i)  +  nR(zi),  G)
subject  to  (3L)  or  (3M).  (Notice  that  the  specification  in  (P)  reflects  the  fact  that  each
resident  in locality  i  derives  an  external  benefit  from  the  provision  of  good  z  to  n  fellow
residents  as  well as from  the  provision  of good  z  by other  localities  to  their  (N  - n)  resi-
dents.)  Given  specified  values of the  central  government  fiscal instruments,  a level of local
public  good provision  z is defined to be a  Nash non-cooperative  equilibrium  with  lump-sum
(respectively,  matching)  grants if zi = z at  a solution  to (P),  subject  to  (3L)  (respectively,
(3M))  for all localities  i and  if the  central  government  budget  constraint  (4L) (respectively,
(4M)) is satisfied  when zi =  i  for all localities  i. 10
Optimality.  Let  us  now define and  characterize  an  optimal  allocation  of resources  for
this  economy  in  order  to  establish  a  benchmark  for  normative  evaluation  of  alternative
policies  and  the  equilibrium  outcomes  they  generate.
Since households  have identical  preferences  and  endowments  and  since localities  are of
equal  size and  have identical  technologies,  it is natural  to  focus on  allocations  of resources
such  that  all  households  attain  identical  consumption  bundles  and  utility  levels.  Given
the  strong  symmetry  and  convexity  assumptions  of this  model,  it  is obvious  that  there  is
a  unique  (x*, z*, G*) that  maximizes  the  common  utility  of  all households  subject  to  the
fundamental  resource  constraint
Xh  +  EZh  +  G <  Nw.  (5)
h  h
9 As discussed,  e.g.,  in Wildasin  (1991),  Nash equilibria  in local  expenditures  generally
differ from  Nash equilibria  in local  taxes.  This distinction  is partly  obviated  in the  present
model  since  localities  use  lump-sum  taxes.  In  the  presence  of matching  grants,  however,
Nash  equilibria  in  levels of  local  expenditure,  zi,  generally  differ from  Nash  equilibria  in
levels  of own-source  expenditure,  ci.  While  the  specification  of  the  strategy  space  is in
general  a  matter  of considerable  importance,  it is not discussed  further  here.
10 Technical  issues  of existence  and  uniqueness  of Nash  equilibria  in this  type  of model
have been  discussed  at  some length  in the  literature  but  are suppressed  here for brevity.
11Note that  since there are no economies of scale in provision of good z, jurisdictional size
is irrelevant in the  determination of efficient allocations.  Defining Z*  =  Eh  (z*), this
first-best allocation of resources is characterized by the Sawnuelson-type  conditions
uz(z*, z*,  Z*, G*)  uz(z*, z*, Z*, G*)I,3(z*)  1  (6.1)
u,(x*,  z*, Z*, G*)  u,(x*,  z*,  Z*,  G*)
N  UG( *, z,  ZG*,)  =1  (6.2)
Ur(x*,  z*,  Z*,  G*)
where derivatives of u(.) are denoted by subscripts. Note for future use that  (4) implies
u  (xz  z* Z  G*) < 1  (7.1)
N  uz(x*, z*  Z*,G*),  < 1  (7.2) uz(a,*  z*, Z*,  G*)
provided that,  at an optimum, the local provision of good z does generate some spillovers
(i.e. provided that uz(.),/3(.) > 0) and provided that there is some purely local benefit from
the provision of good z (i.e., u2(.) > 0).
Optimal Grant Design.  It  is well known that  Nash equilibria, as defined above, are
generally  not efficient. In a somewhat  degenerate sense, lump-sum  grants offer one means by
which central governments can induce efficient  decisions by local governments. Specifically,
the central government can impose a tax of TL*  =  z* + G*/N on each household and use
this tax to offer a lump-sum grant of g* = z* per capita to each jurisdiction.  Given this
level of lump-sum grants, no locality wishes to impose any local taxes in order to increase
its level of provision  of good z. 'I  In this case, all local provision of good z is financed by
grants from the center, so that there is no own-source  revenue collected  by any locality and
the fiscal system is in effect fully centralized.
More interestingly, it is possible to use matching grants to achieve an efficient Nash
equilibrium in which there is still some meaningful degree of fiscal decentralization.  The
first-order conditions for (P) which must hold in a Nash equilibrium with matching grants
imply that  each locality chooses a level of local public good provision z' such that
UZ,(xI,  z', Z', G*)  uz(x',  z', ZI,  G*)
u,(z',  z', Z', G*)  U(z',  z', Z', G*)  m  (8)
where x' is endowment net of local and central taxes. Following  standard Pigovian principles,
if the center selects the matching rate
M*  = (N-  n) uz(x*  z*  'Z*,  G )d(*)  (9)
1  In fact, each locality would prefer to reduce its expenditures on good z below z* =g
but this is impossible by virtue of the assumed conditionality of these grants.
12and  a level  of taxes  T,  =  m*z*  + G*  per  capita,  the  equilibrium  condition  (8) coincides
with  the  optimality  condition  (6.1)  and  the  Nash equilibrium  is efficient.
The  essential  features  of this  analysis  are  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  which  depicts  the
choices between  xi  and  z; facing  a  particular  locality  i,  taking  as  given the  levels of local
public  good provision in other jurisdictions.  In the  absence of central  government  taxes  and
grants,  the  menu  of attainable  own-consumption  bundles  (xi, zi)  is given  by the  45-degree
line  AB,  where  the  distance  OA  =  w.  With  central  taxes  of Tm per  capita  and  a match-
ing  rate  of m,  the  budget  constraint  becomes  the  flattened  line A'B',  where  the  distance
OA'  = w -Tm.  The  vertical  distance  between  A'B'  and  AB  represents  the  difference be-
tween the  matching  grants  received by  locality  i and  the  taxes  that  it pays  to  the  central
government.  Only  if locality  i  chooses the  consumption  bundle  E  at  which  the  two  con-
straints  cross will the  amount  of grants  received be equal to the  amount  of taxes paid.  The
central  government  budget  constraint  (4M)  requires  that  localities  choose points  like E  "on
average"  or  in aggregate;  in the  present  model,  with identical  preferences  and  endowments
for all  households,  an  efficient Nash  equilibrium  with  matching  grants  is characterized  by
identical  levels of public  good provision  in all localities  and  thus  each  locality  must  choose
a consumption  bundle  like E,  such that  it is neither  a net  contributor  to nor  a net  recipient
from  the  central  government.  In  Figure  1,  Ufo is a  projection  of  a  level curve  of  locality
i's  utility  function  onto  the  (xi, zi)  plane.  The  locality  will choose point  E  on the  budget
constraint  A'B'  if this  indifference  curve  is tangent  to A'B'  at  E,  as illustrated.  If central
government  taxes  and  matching  rates  are at  their  optimal  levels of T,m and  m*,  then  each
locality faces a budget  constraint  A'B'  that  intersects  AB  at  a level of zi4  = z*, the  efficient
level of provision  of  good  z.  Moreover,  given  that  all  other  localities  provide  z*  units  of
good z, the  indifference  curves of locality  i projected  onto the  (zi, zi) plane will be such that
there  is a tangency  between  an  indifference  curve  and  A'B'  at  point  E  and  locality  i will
therefore  choose  e  =  Z*.
To summarize  the  basic lessons of the  standard  theory,  a program  of lump-sum  grants
produces  income  effects but  no relative  price or  substitution  effects and  is thus  a poor  in-
strument  for  central  governments  to  use in  attempting  to internalize  the  external  benefits
associated  with  the  decentralized  provision  of  local  public  goods.  On  the  other  hand,  it
is possible  to  achieve efficient outcomes  with  matching  grants  while still  preserving  mean-
ingful fiscal decentralization,  since local own-contributions  to local public  expenditures  are
generally  positive  in equilibrium.  Moreover, under  a system  of matching  grants,  the  central
government  does not directly  control  the level of local  public good provision; rather,  it alters
the  budget  constraint  facing  a  locality,  leaving  the  choice of  a  consumption  bundle  along
that  constraint  in the  hands  of local  decisionmakers.
This  standard  theory  has several  limitations.  For instance,  it can be criticized for ignor-
ing the  possibility  that  localities  might  engage  in direct  negotiations  ("Coasian  bargains")
to  arrive at  efficient outcomes  or for assuming that  the central  government  can ascertain  the
magnitude  of interjurisdictional  spillovers and  thus to  calculate appropriate  matching  grant
13rate  given in (9).  It  also abstracts  from the  complexity  of local public-sector  decisionmaking
by  in effect  treating  each  locality  as  a  single representative  agent  that  optimizes  subject
to its  budget  constraint;  this  assumption  is comparatively  innocuous  when all residents  are
identical,  as assumed  here,  but  it can be quite  problematic  in the  more realistic  case where
residents  are  heterogeneous.  Despite  these  and  other  limitations,  however,  the  standard
model provides  a simple and  familiar  starting  point  for the  present  analysis.
III.  Credibility  and  Bailouts
A.  The  Basic  Rationale  for Bailouts
One key feature  of the  conventional  analysis of intergovernmental  grants  is the  assump-
tion  that  localities  take  the  parameters  of  central  government  grant  policies  as  given.  In
game-theoretic  terms,  one might  describe  the  central  government  as a Stackelberg  leader  or
first  mover,  with  localities  adapting  as well as  they  can to  the  policies announced  to them.
In practice,  however, the  central  government  may not  be able to enforce a commitment  to its
announced  policies; indeed,  a departure  from announced  constraints  seems to be an essential
feature  of  "bailouts"  and  "soft"  budget  constraints.  A more elaborate  sequential  structure
of actions  by central  and  local  governments  is needed.
To illustrate  the basic issues within the  context  of the  model developed  above,  suppose
that  the  center  offers each locality a matching  rate  of m* for its expenditures  on good z which
would support  an  efficient level z  of per  capita  expenditures.  Imagine,  however,  that  some
locality sets  zi =  0, for example  by failing to provide even basic services such  as inoculation
of residents  against  communicable  diseases.  This  could  be  the  result  of very low local  tax
effort  or  of  a diversion  of local  public  funds  to  other  goods  and  services  that  produce  no
external  benefits.  12  Under  these  circumstances,  it  may not  be  rational,  and  therefore  not
credible, for the central  government  simply to accept locality i's  decision not to provide good
z.  This question  cannot  be answered without  some theory  about  how the  central government
formulates  its  policies, but  to anticipate  the  discussion below, observe  that  the  residents  of
other  jurisdictions  are  certainly  not indifferent  to the  level of zi.  In fact,  given that  locality
i contributes  nothing  toward provision  of good  z, the  residents  of other  localities  might  well
be  willing to  pay  something  to  raise zi  above 0.  Thus,  if the  central  government  responds
to the  interests  of residents  in other jurisdictions,  it might  intervene  by directly  controlling
the  provision of good  z in locality i, for instance  by using its  own resources for this  purpose.
Such an  intervention  could appropriately  be  described  as a  "bailout"  for locality  i.
Depending  on the  generosity  of the  prospective  bailout,  it  might  or  might  not  be  at-
tractive  to  locality  i to  induce  the  center  to  trigger  it by  setting  z,  =  0.  If the  prospect
12  To  keep the  notational  burden  to  a  minimum,  no other  local  government  goods  and
services  have  been  explicitly  specified  in the  model.  Any  quasi-private  local  public  goods
that  do not generate  benefits to non-residents  may be subsumed  within the  all-purpose  good
x,  however.
14of  a  bailout  is unattractive,  locality  i  would prefer  to  set  zi  =  z*  and  accept  matching
funds from  the  center,  as in the  standard  theory.  In  this  case, the  center  presents  locality  i
with  a budget  constraint  of the  form  (3M) and  the  locality  chooses a consumption  bundle
satisfying  that  constraint.  We may  then  say  that  the  budget  constraint  is hard.  On  the
other  hand,  suppose  that  the  central  government  sets  a  high level of provision  of good z  if
locality  i chooses not  to use its  own resources for this  purpose.  Then  the  welfare of locality
i's  residents  may  actually  be  increased  by not  funding  the  provision  of good  z at  all, thus
inducing  a  central  government  bailout.  When  this  occurs, the  locality  induces the  center  to
reveal that  the  budget  constraint  (3M) is not actually  credible.  In particular,  (3M) indicates
that  zero  own-contributions  to  the  provision  of good  z  should  result  in no  transfers  from
the  center,  but  in fact  a  zero  level  of own-contributions  actually  does  elicit  central  gov-
ernment  financial  support  for the  locality.  The  constraint  in this  case  can  be described  as
soft.  In game-theoretic  language,  one could say that  the hard  budget  constraint  equilibrium
postulated  in the  traditional  approach  is not subgame  perfect.
The objective  of the  present  section  is to develop a  formal model  which makes precise
these intuitive  notions  of hard  and  soft budget  constraints  and which allows a determination
of conditions  under  which  bailouts  do and  do not occur.
B. A  Formal Model of Bailouts
It  is sufficient to  focus on  the  relationship  between  a single  locality  i  and  the  central
government.  Suppose  that  the  center  announces  an optimal  matching  rate  m* as defined in
(9) and  that  all other  localities  choose first-best  levels of own-contributions  to the  provision
of good  z,  c*  (1 - m*)z*,  thus  achieving  the  optimal  provision  level  z*.  The  question
is whether  locality  i  chooses also  to  set  ci  =  c*  and  accept  the  central  matching  grant,
in which  case there  is no  bailout,  or  instead  chooses some other  level of own-contributions
in  anticipation  of  a  central  government  bailout.  The  locality's  choice obviously  depends
on  the  bailout  policy  of  the  central  government,  which  describes  what  level  of  bailout  a
locality  receives  if it  deviates  from  the  first-best  contribution  level c*.  Since the  central
government  determines  whether  or not  to bail out  locality  i after  observing  its  choice of ci,
the  relationship  between  the  locality  and  the  central  government  has  a sequential  structure.
We therefore  analyze  this  relationship  recursively,  considering  first  the  formulation  of the
central  government's  bailout  policy.
Central  Government  Bailout  Policy.
Let  the  level of  own-contributions  chosen  by locality  i  be  denoted  by  c',  which  may
or  may  not  be  equal  to  c*.  Assume  that  the  central  government  can intervene  in  locality
i's  provision  of good  z after  observing  ct by  adding  a conditional  lump-sum  grant  of g'  to
locality i's  own contribution,  resulting  in a level of provision denoted by z'  = c' +g'.  In order
to  do this,  the  center  must  have some source  of funds  available;  for concreteness,  suppose
that  the  center  can  adjust  its  level of expenditure  on good  G after  observing  the  locality's
15choice of c'.  13
In  addition  to  specifying  the  source  of  central  government  funding  for  bailouts,  it  is
necessary  to  describe  the  objectives  that  guide  the  central  government's  choice of bailout.
There  are  several  plausible  ways to  do this,  but  one  that  seems  particularly  natural  is to
suppose  that  the  center  intervenes  in the  fiscal affairs of locality  i on behalf  of those  house-
holds in the  economy that  do not reside in the locality.  The externalities  generated  by local
public  good provision  provide the  presumed  rationale  for the  program  of intergovernmental
matching  grants  to  begin  with,  and  the  failure  of a  locality  to  avail itself  of  these  grants
and  thus  to  generate  the  external  benefits  that  they  would  finance  provide  the  presumed
justification  for  any  bailout.  It  therefore  seems  worthwhile  exploring  the  hypothesis  that
the  center  acts to maximize  the  welfare of households  residing  outside  of the  locality  i that
is being  considered  for a bailout.
Given  these  assumptions,  and  noting  that  N  - n  is the  total  number  of  households
residing  in localities  other  than  i,  the  central  government's  "bailout"  optimization  problem
can be  written  as
(B)  max< 9 ',GI>U  (X*,  Z, (N - n),8(z*) +  n,8  .g')  ')
subject  to
ngt +  G' = NT-m*  ((N-n)z*  + n  c').  (10)
The  objective  function  in; (B)  is the  utility  of  a  representative  household  residing  in  any
locality  other  than  i.  Note  that  all  of  the  terms  on  the  right-hand-side  of  the  central
government  budget  constraint  (10) are already  determined  when deciding  on the  bailout  g9
to be given  to locality  i.  Using (10) to solve for G'  in terms  of g'  and  substituting  into the
utility  function  in (B)  reduces the  problem  to  an  unconstrained  maximization  with  respect
to gq. The  first-order  condition
uz()d (C,+  g)  <  1(1
must  hold  as  a strict  equality  if g'  >  0,  i.e., if there  is actually  a bailout.  Since  iY'(.) >  0
and  u(.)  is strictly  quasi-concave,
D _  n (uzz(-)/  (-) 2 - 2UGZ(.)1'(-)  +  UGG(.))  +  UZ(-)/"(-)  <  0  (12)
13  If there  is no source  of funds  available  to the  center  once c'- is selected,  for instance  if
T,  G, and  m are  all precommitted,  or if it is impossible  for the  center  to change  its policies
after  c'  is  chosen,  a  bailout  is  infeasible,  budget  constraints  are  hard  and  the  problem
under  analysis  disappears.  The  assumption  that  funds for bailouts  are obtained  by reducing
expenditures  on centrally-provided  public goods is not  crucial for the  analysis, and the results
would go through  without  essential  change  if one  assumes  instead  that  central  government
tax  increases  are  used  to  finance  bailouts.  In  practice,  central  governments  can  finance
bailouts  by increasing  the  deficit,  which  can be  interpreted  as a reduction  in future  public
good  provision or  an  increase in future  taxes  (or some uncertain  mix of the  two).
16which  ensures  satisfaction  of the  second-order  condition  for (B).
The  values of g'  and  G'  that  solve the  bailout  problem  (B)  generally  depend  on  the
level  of community  i's  own-contribution,  c'.  For instance,  suppose  locality  i  chooses its
contribution  at  the  first-best  optimal  level c'  =  z*.  Then  it follows directly  from  (6)  and
(7) that  (11) must  hold as  a strict  inequality  at  a solution  to  (B),  and,  by continuity,  this
inequality  must  hold for any c  sufficiently close to z*. In other words, a locality  that  chooses
a level of own-contributions  to provision  of good  z  that  is optimal  or sufficiently  close to
optimal  receives no bailout  from  the  central government.
Can  a locality  ever obtain  a positive bailout?  If
uz(x*,z*,  (N  - n)Y(z*) + nl3(0),G)  '  O) >  1  13
UG(x*,  z*, (N  - n)/(z*)  + n/(O), G*)  (O)  ,  (1)
the  central  government  bails out  locality  i if it sets  ce =  0 and  thus  makes no  contribution
at  all to provision  of good  z.  Indeed,  by continuity,  (13) implies  that  the  center  chooses a
positive  bailout  g'  >  0 for all own-contributions  c  sufficiently  close to  zero.  High  values
of ,B'(0) and  of uz(.)/uG(.)  increase  the  left-hand  side  of (13),  indicating,  as  is intuitive,
that  a  bailout  is relatively  attractive  to  the  center  if the  first  units  of good  z  provided  to
a locality  produce  large  external  benefits  and  if external  benefits  have a  high value,  at  the
margin,  relative  to provision of the national  public good G, which we have assumed  to be the
source  of funds  from  which bailouts  are financed.  Note  that  this  relative  valuation  depends
on (N  - n)fl(z*)  + n#(O) and  thus  on n (13(z*) - k(0)).  If a  large locality  does not  provide
good  z  and  if each  household's  consumption  of good  z  produces  a large  external  benefit,
the  total  level of externalities  in the economy will be significantly  reduced  and  the valuation
of Z  relative  to  G  will therefore  be  relatively  high.  On  the  other  hand,  if n  is very small,
(N  - n)/(z*  ) + n/3(0)  z  Z* and  the  fact that  locality  i is not  providing good z will leave the
relative valuation  of Z and G essentially  unchanged  from its value at the first-best  optimum.
For all values of c'  such  that  the  bailout  gt is positive,  (11) must  hold  as  an  equality.
Since  D  < 0,  one  can  solve this  equation  implicitly  for  the  bailout  level g9 as  a  function
g' = y(c')  of the  own-contribution  level  c' such that
_  , <y'(e)  < 0;  (14)
in particular,  7'(c')  =  -1/(1  - m*)  in the  special  case where  the  utility  function  is quasi-
linear  in  G.  14  In  this  special  case,  each  unit  increase  in own-contributions  by  locality  i
14  To  derive  (14),  totally  differentiate  the  first-order  condition  (11).  Recalling  (10),  it
follows that
_dgi'  1  n (UGG(-)  -UZG(-)#'(-))
dc  1 - m*  +
The second  term  on the  right-hand  side lies in the  interval  [0, 1); in particular,  this  term  is
zero in the  special  case where UG(.)  is constant.
17leads to an increase in matching grants together with a reduction in the central government
bailout gt that leaves the level of provision of the local public good in locality i unchanged,
i.e., matching grants together with the bailout function y(-)  entail a 100%  implicit tax at the
margin on local government  public expenditures from own-source  revenues. More generally,
if all goods are strictly normal, -1/(1  - m*)  < y'(c') < 0, and the bailout function entails
an implicit tax  on local own-contributions at  a rate  of less than  100%, i.e., increases in
own-contributions are partially but not completely  offset by reductions in net transfers from
the central government.
In summary, the interval [0,  z*] can be partitioned by some level 8i of own-contributions
by locality i such that  there is no central government bailout whenever own-contributions
fall in the interval [4, z*], where 4  < z*. The critical value c'z  will be strictly positive if the
externalities associated with locality i's provision  of good z are sufficiently  strong that  (13)
holds, and in this case the bailout is a strictly positive and monotonically  declining function
of the own-contribution level for all values of c' in the interval [0,  ci]. An interesting feature
of this model is that  bailouts can only be triggered by discrete departures from first-best
optimal levels of local public expenditure.
Local Government Bailout Policy.
The bailout function -y(.)  derived above is determined as a matter of central government
policy, but there is a sense in which local governments also have "bailout policies," since
they control the  level of own-contributions to the local public good and thus determine
whether to trigger a central government bailout. The condition (13) shows whether locality
i can induce a bailout from the center, and it is therefore a necessary condition for locality
i to face a soft budget constraint. However,  it is not sufficient  for a soft budget constraint,
since the bailout may be sufficiently unattractive  that  a locality would always choose an
own-consumption level greater than  ci.  It  is thus necessary to analyze the local choice of
own-contributions to local public goods.
First, if the locality chooses  c' > d'z,  it receives  no bailout from the center. In this case,
it faces the budget  constraint under matching grants (3M) with m =  m* and its utility-
maximizing choice under this  constraint is to set c'  =  z*.  Therefore, the locality never
chooses  contribution levels in the (open) internal (E<,  z*).
Now suppose instead that  locality i chooses ci < e;.  It then receives a bailout 7(cD,
and hence the consumption bundle that  its residents receive is defined by the relations
x'  w - T-ci  (15.1)
Z; =  l-m.  +  7(Ci )  (15.2)
Z' = (N-  n)f8(z*) + nI3(zi)  (15.3)
G=  NT-  m* ((N  - n)z* + n Iim*  - n7y(ci)  (15.4)
The utility level obtained by locality i in the event of a bailout is thus u(x2, zi, Z', G'), with
18each  argument  depending  on the  choice of c,.  Let  ci denote the  value of ci that  maximizes
utility  in locality  i,  and  let  (Zi, 4  Z,  ZG)  denote the  values derived  from  (15) when  ci = c2.
The first-order  condition  for a maximum  of u(xz, zi, Z',  G')  with  respect  to c'  is
(i  ±  ) +n  Z{  1B'(@))  (I  lm*  + 7')  -n  (ITg  n  +  ')  <  1,  (16)
with  strict  equality  if c'  > 0.  Note  that  this  reduces to
___)<  1  (16')
in the  special case where  the  utility  function  is quasi-linear  in G so that  7  -1/(1  - m*).
In  this  case,  locality  1 makes  positive  contributions  to  provision  of  good  z  only  because
its  residents  would  benefit  more from  a smaller  bailout  which  would free resources  for the
central  government  to spend  on the  national  public good G.  In this  case we might  plausibly
expect  locality  i to  set  ci  =  0,  especially  if localities  are  small.  More generally,  the  first-
order  condition  (16) requires  localities  to choose a level of own-contributions  that  takes into
account  central  matching  grants,  bailouts,  and  their  impact  on the  center's  own public good
provision  level.  It  is not  necessarily  the  case that  the  locality  will set  own-contributions  at
zero,  but  the  possibility  certainly  exists.  In  any  case, the  own-contribution  level ai lies in
the  interval  [0, c'] and  is therefore  lower than  the first-best  optimum.
The  crucial  question  now is whether  the  utility  attained  by locality  i in the  event  of a
bailout  is higher or lower than  the  utility  it attains  if it chooses c  = z* and  does not  induce
a bailout.  Locality  i induces  a bailout  - its  budget  constraint  is soft  - if
u(zi,  Zil,  Z',  G')-u(x*,  z*, Z*, G*) > 0.  (17)
To  gain  some  insight  into  the  conditions  under  which  (17) holds,  consider  Figure  2.  The
budget  constraint  A*B* shows the  menu  of bundles  of good  x and  z available  to  locality  i
when the  central  government  offers a matching  grant  at rate  m*.  The  indifference curve  U*,
which is the  projection  of u(xi,  zi, (N  - n),(z*)  + nIB(zi), G*) onto  the  (xi, zi)  plane,  shows
that  a locality chooses the optimal  level of z, z*, if it adheres to the budget  constraint  A*  B*.
Assuming that  condition  (13) holds,  however,  A*B* is not  really  the  constraint  facing  the
locality.  In  particular,  if it sets  ci =  0, it  will induce  a bailout  from  the  central  government
such  that  a positive  level of zi = 7(0) is attained,  allowing the  locality  to consume a bundle
(xi, zi)  =  (w  - T, y(O)), denoted  in the  figure by  point  S  which  lies to  the  right  of point
A*.  Assuming  for convenience  of illustration  that  the  utility  function  is quasi-linear  in G,
so that  '  _-1/(1  - m*),  any  increases  in locality  i's  contributions  above ci = 0 result  in
reductions  in the  bailout  that  leave zi unchanged  until  the bailout  is reduced to  (ci*f)  = 0 at
the  contribution  level ci = ei.  The vertical  segment  ST  represents  the  consumption  bundles
attainable  to locality  i's  residents  when it chooses levels of own-contributions  ciC[O, f]. The
budget  constraint  that  locality  i really faces, then,  is not  A*B* but  STB*.  15
15  If all goods  are  normal,  7'  >  -1/(1  - m*)  and  the  segment  ST  is downward-sloping
rather  than  vertical.
19As  drawn,  the  point  S lies above  the  indifference  curve  U*. This  does not  necessarily
mean that  the locality  wishes to induce a bailout,  since a bailout  lowers the  level of provision
of the  national  public  good G  and  this  means  that  the  residents  of locality  i would require
a consumption  bundle  (xi, zi) lying strictly  above the  indifference  curve U* to be as well off
as  at  the  no-bailout  equilibrium  (x*, z*).  However, if the  bailout  is sufficiently generous  so
that  4  and  thus  S lie sufficiently far to the right,  the  utility  of local residents  will indeed by
maximized  by inducing  a  bailout.  On  the  other  hand,  if 4  is sufficiently  small that  point
S  lies on or  under  the  indifference  curve  U*, local  residents  are  definitely  worse off in the
event of a bailout  and  would not  choose to induce  one.
It  is clear  from  Figure  2 that  whether  a locality  chooses to induce  a  bailout  depends
partly  on its  own  preferences,  as  represented  by  the  shape  of  indifference  curves  like U*.
Whether  the locality  induces a bailout  also depends  on the external  effects that  its  provision
of good  z generates  for other  localities.  These  effects determine  the  location  of the  critical
point  c'  and  thus  the  point T  at  which the  level of own contributions  is sufficiently high to
reduce the  bailout  to zero, and they  determine  as well the  rest  of the  bailout  function  (c'),
represented  in  the  diagram  by  the  segment  ST.  Roughly  speaking,  if  own-consumption
of good  z  is highly  substitutable  with  consumption  of other  goods,  the  indifference  cure
U* will be  relatively  flat  and  a bailout  is more likely.  By contrast,  if local  residents  have
a  very  inelastic  demand  for good  z,  the  lower level of  provision  attained  under  a  bailout
plan  is likely to be  unattractive  and  they  will not  induce  a  bailout.  If external  effects are
strong,  the  schedule  ST  will lie relatively  far  to the  right  and  bailouts  are  thus  more likely
to  raise  the  welfare  of  local  residents,  whereas  the  opposite  is true  if external  effects  are
small.  Indeed,  the  distance  between  the  socially-efficient level of local  public good provision
and  the  critical value of own-contributions  E4  below which the  central  government  intervenes
with  a bailout  can be  viewed,  in a  rough  way, as an  indicator  of the  relative  importance  of
local  and  external  benefits from  the  provision  of the  local public  good.  With  a  low level of
external  benefits,  e  is small,  the  points  S  and  T in Figure  2 lie close to point  A*, and  the
segment  ST  becomes small;  in the  extreme  case where  there  are no external  effects,  c' =  0
and  the  segment  ST  disappears.  In  this  case,  there  is no  possibility  of  a  bailout  and  the
local budget  constraint  is definitely  hard.  By contrast,  if external  effects are large  and  local
benefits  from  local  public  good provision  are  small,  <  lies close to  z*.  In  the  extreme  case
where  there  are  no local own-benefits  and  where  the local  population  is reduced  to a single
household,  all of the  benefits  are external  and  4  =  z*. In this  case, a bailout  is unavoidable.
IV.  Bailouts  and  Jurisdictional  Size
The  analysis  in  Section  III  has  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  all localities  are  of
the  same size,  n.  How does this  variable  affect the  central  government's  bailout  policy  and
the  prospect  that  localities  might  choose to induce  bailouts?  Does this  model  suggest  that
fiscal decentralization,  which  may  be  interpreted  within  the  model  as  the  organization  of
the  public  sector  into numerous  small jurisdictions  rather  than  a few large ones, is likely to
soften  local  budget  constraints?  Or,  on the contrary,  does it suggest  that  bailouts  are more
20likely when localities are large in size? Does the model provide a formal foundation for the
notion that  localities can be "too big to fail"?
It  is difficult to answer these questions without imposing additional structure on the
model.  When a  locality decides whether or not  to  induce a  bailout, it  must compare
two discretely different consumption bundles, (x*, z*, Z*, G*) and  (i', 2', Z', G'),  involv-
ing every argument of the utility function.  Assessing the effect of jurisdictional size on
bailouts  amounts to  modelling the vector (z',  ', Z', G')  as a function of n, determining
whether the u(z', z', Z', G') is increasing or decreasing in n, and comparing its value with
u(x*, z*, Z*, G*).
In order to shed some light on this formidable analytical problem, the present section
explores the implications of successively  more specialized  assumptions about preferences. To
begin with, suppose that  the utility function is additively separable in each argument and
quasi-linear in G, the national public good, i.e.,
(A)  u(x, z, Z, G) _  A(x) + B(z) + C(Z)  + G.
One important implication of quasi-linearity  in G has already been noted, namely, that
y'(cS)  =-1/(1-m*)  whenever  -y(c') > 0. Hence, ci/(l-m*)+g'  = cl/(I-m*)+y(c$)  = e-'
for all values of own-contributions c' such that  the center is willing to bail out the locality.
Under these conditions, localities are likely to choose either cl = z* or c' =  0, since small
positive own-contributions to the provision  of good z are completely offset by reductions in
bailouts from the center. More precisely,  if household preferences  satisfy (A), we know from
(16') that  they will choose  either c' = 0 or c' = z* if
n c  A'(w-  T*).  (16")
When (16") holds, as will  be assumed for the remainder of this section, the analysis simplifies
considerably.  16  In particular,  if a bailout occurs, (16") insures that  c' = 0, that  the level
of bailout is therefore the unique value -y(O)  = e', and that  the bailout is precisely the level
of consumption of the local public good z that will be consumed  by residents in the locality
receiving  the bailout, i.e.,  ' = c'i= y(O).
Assuming that preferences satisfy (A), the unique bailout level c' that  the center pro-
vides is determined by the first-order condition (11), which now takes the form
04y(e)'(-)  < 1(1'
where
Z  =  (N  - nf)3(z*) + nfl(5l)  = Z-  n(/3(z*)  - . (18)
16  Specific  examples where (16") holds are provided below.
21This  condition  is satisfied  as an  equality  if the  bailout  4  is strictly  positive,  which  will be
true  if and  only if (13) holds,  i.e.,
C  (Z*  - n (f(z*)  - i(0)))  P'(0)  > 1.  (13')
For a  given  utility  function  satisfying  (A)  and  for  a given  external  benefit  function  86(.),
whether  or  not  condition  (13')  holds depends  only on the  value of n.  In particular,  since
dZ
d=  (P(z*)  -(0))  < 0,  (19)
and  since C(.)  is strictly  concave in Z,  it follows that  there  is a critical  value of jurisdiction
size, say nc[O,  N] such  that  (13')  does not hold for all n < n while it does hold for all n > ii.
That  is,  there  is a  critical  jurisdiction  size ii such  that  localities  no  larger than  ni receive
no  bailout  from  the  center,  whereas localities  larger than  n  do receive positive  bailouts,  if
they  choose a zero  level of own-contributions  to good  z.  Furthermore,  using  (11')  to solve
implicitly  for e  as  a function  of n,  we have
de_  nC"(Z)'(V)  (  f()O)  > 0  for  n >  fi,  (20)
dn  nC"1(Z)I3'(E,) 2 +ClZ61e)
i.e., the  size of the  bailout  offered by  the  center  to a locality  that  makes  zero own-contribu-
tions  to local provision  of good  z is higher, the larger the locality.  In short,  given additively
separate  and  quasi-linear  preferences  as specified in (A),  larger  localities  can extract  larger
bailouts from  the central government  than smaller ones, and small localities may not  be able
to extract  any  bailout  from  the  center at  all.
These  considerations  clearly  suggest  that  larger  localities  are  more  likely to face  soft
budget  constraints  than  smaller  ones.  However, the  analysis  so far is still incomplete  since,
as noted  in Section  III,  whether  a locality  faces a  hard  or  soft budget  constraint  depends
not only on the size of the bailout  it receives from the center,  if any, but on the utility  payoff
of the  consumption  bundle  it  attains  under  a bailout  as  compared  to  that  attainable  with
first-best  optimal  own-contributions.  It is true  that  localities  of size n  < n always choose a
first-best  optimal  level  of local  contributions  to good  z, c'  =  z*, since they  have  no chance
of obtaining  a bailout.  These jurisdictions  therefore  certainly  face hard  budget  constraints.
More generally, however, the  residents  of a jurisdiction  that  fails to finance  an optimal  level
of provision  of good  z  may  obtain  a bailout  from  the  center,  and  if so,  they  (a)  consume
more than  x* units  of private  goods  by escaping some or all of the  burden  of local  taxes  to
finance  good  z,  (b)  consume  a  level of  good  z, financed  in part  or  in total  by the  central
government  bailout,  which is less than  z*, (c) enjoy  a level of external  benefits  less than  Z*,
since their  fellow residents  consume less than  z* units  of good  z, and  (d) consume a level of
the  national  public  good G that  is augmented  by the  fact  that  the  locality  receives a lower
amount  of matching  grants  from the  center  but  that  is reduced because  the  locality receives
a bailout.  Taking  all of these factors  into account, it is hardly obvious whether  bailouts raise
or lower utility  for a locality's  residents,  or  whether  bailouts  are  more or less attractive  to
large localities  compared  with small ones.
22In the  face of these intricacies,  it is useful to resort  to illustrative  numerical  calculations.
The  calculations  reported  here  are  based  on  a  further  specialization  of  the  assumptions
embodied  in (A).  Specifically, assume  that
A(x)  = alnx  a > 0
B(z)  = boz - bl Z2  bi > O,  i = 0, 1
2 C(Z)=  coZ-_  elZ2  C, >  ,  i =0,1
,B(z)  = ,°0Z _  :2 Z2  pi>  0,  i  =  0,  1.
These  functional  specifications  are selected  both  because  they  are  computationally  conve-
nient  and  because  they  are  economically  well-behaved.
The  functional  forms  and  parameters  are  not  chosen to  simulate  a real  economy but
rather  to shed light  on the working of the model.  It is desirable, however, to choose values so
that  endogenous  variables  take on values in intermediate  ranges where  boundary  properties
of the  model  do not  affect the  results  decisively.  As a matter  of normalization,  let  N  =  100
and  w =  10. Other  parameters  are  chosen such that  x* = 7, z* =  1, and  G* = 2N  = 200; at
the  first-best  optimum,  then,  70% of income is allocated  to private  good  consumption,  20%
to the  national  public  good G, and  10% to the  local  public  good z.  In  addition,  parameter
values are  selected  to  insure  that  (16")  is satisfied.  This  simplifies the  analysis  by insuring
that  own-contributions  are  either  0 or  the  first-best  optimal  amount,  z* =  1.  The issues of
primary  interest  concern the  effect of jurisdictional  size n (a)  on the  bailouts  offered by the
central  government  and  (b) on the utility  payoff to a locality  if it accepts  a bailout  compared
with  the  utility  level at  a first-best  optimum.  To investigate  these effects,  n  is allowed to
take  on integer  values from  1 to 50, representing  jurisdictional  sizes from  1% to  50% of the
national  population.
What  do the numerical  results  show? To begin with a concise overview, it may be noted
first  that  they  of course confirm  (20), that  is, the  bailout  offered by the  central  government
to a  locality  is larger,  the  larger  the  locality.  Moreover,  if localities  are  sufficiently  small,
they  are not  offered any  bailout  at  all.  Furthermore,  the calculations  reveal  that  the  utility
payoff in  the  event  of a  bailout  is larger  for larger  localities,  and  that  in some  cases  large
localities  find that  utility  is higher under  a bailout  than  at the  first best  optimum.  In these
cases, the local government  budget  constraint  is soft  in the  sense defined above,  that  is, (a)
the  central  government  does  offer resources  to the  locality  to finance  provision  of good  z if
the  locality  fails  to do so (i.e., there  is a  non-zero bailout)  and  (b) the  locality  prefers  this
outcome  to  that  attainable  if it makes  the  first-best  optimal  level of own-contributions  to
provision  of good  z  (i.e., the  locality  prefers the  bailout  to the  first-best  outcome).
Table  1 reports  some additional  details  of the  findings  and  their  sensitivity  to  critical
parameters.  The  three  columns  correspond  to  increasing  values  of  the  parameter  c0,  a
parameter  that  reflects  the  importance  of external  effects in the  utility  function,  the  three
23rows correspond to increasing values of bo, a parameter that  reflects the magnitude of the
own- benefit from local public good provision. The first number in each cell is n, that is, the
minimum size of jurisdiction that receives a positive bailout from the center if its own-level
of contributions to provision of good z is zero; thus, in the second column, we see that
localities that  constitute at least 21% of the national population receive positive bailouts.
If smaller localities choose  not to provide the local public good, they receive no bailout at
all.  We immediately see that  localities of size n <  21 thus face hard budget constraints.
This critical value in  depends on the importance of external effects; with a smaller value of
co, the first column shows that  ii = 34, whereas the third column shows that  n =  7 when
co takes on a larger value. Note that  n does not depend on the parameter bo, which reflects
the own-benefit  from local public good provision. The central government acts as the agent
of other localities in deciding  whether or not (and by how much) to bail out a given locality,
and does not  concern itself with the direct benefits of its bailout to the residents of the
locality. Variations in bo do not affect the size of the external benefit from local public good
provision and thus do not affect n.
The own-benefits from local public good provision, as measured by bo, certainly do
affect the desirability to a locality of inducing a bailout from the center.  Since the center
ignores local benefits when choosing the  level of bailout, the  level of local public good
provision di' is smaller than  the first-best level z* in a locality that  receives a bailout.  If
local own- benefits are important, then the drop in local public good provision from z* to
e4  is costly to local residents and a bailout is less appealing on this account, whereas if local
own-benefits  are relatively insignificant  the reduction in the consumption of good z under a
bailout does not matter very much to local residents. The second entry in each cell of Table
1 shows  the minimum size of jurisdiction at which utility under a bailout exceeds  the utility
obtained at a first-best optimum. Thus, the second row of the second column shows that
localities that  constitute 41% or more of national population are better  off under bailouts.
These jurisdictions therefore  face soft budget constraints. Under the same parameter values,
localities of sizes ranging between 21% and 41% of the national population would indeed
be bailed out by the center if they chose not to provide good z locally, but the terms of
the bailout are sufficiently  unattractive  that  they prefer not to induce bailouts.  Localities
of these sizes, then,  face hard  budget  constraints.  This is in addition to  localities that
contain less than  21% of the national population and which, as noted above, never obtain
bailouts.  Looking down rows in the middle column, we see that smaller localities (n > 34)
face soft budget constraints when own-benefits  from the local public good are relatively less
important, as reflected  in the low  value of bo  used in the top row, whereas when own-benefits
are relatively more important, as reflected  in the high value of bo  used in the third row, even
a  locality containing half of the national population would not wish to  induce a  bailout
(n > 50).
The first column shows that  even very large localities (n  =  50) do not wish to induce
bailouts when external effects are weak; this is true for all three values of the own-benefit
24parameter  b0. Weak external  effects imply  not only that  the  number  of localities  that  can
obtain  non-zero  bailouts  from  the  center  is small, but  also that  the  size of the  bailouts  that
they  can obtain  is relatively  small,  making  bailouts  unattractive.  (To save space,  bailout
levels themselves  are  not  reported.)  In  the  first  column, although  localities  containing  34%
or more of the  population  can obtain  positive bailouts,  the  bailout  level is sufficiently  small
that  all localities  (up  to  and  including  those  of size n  =  50)  are  worse off under  bailouts
than  at  the first-best  optimum.  Thus, local  government  budget  constraints  are  always hard
for  the  parameter  values shown  in  this  column.  In  the  third  column,  the  external  effect
parameter  co is larger  and  now  bailouts  are  offered,  and  are  attractive,  even  to relatively
small localities.  When  the  own-benefits  parameter  bo is small (the  top  row),  localities  that
contain  16% or  more of the  population  face soft  local  budget  constraints.  If own-benefits
are relatively  highly  valued (the  third  row), this  critical  size rises to 20%.
These numerical  results  are not of course particularly  general.  However, they  do provide
concrete  illustrations  of several  important  features  of the  model.  For instance,  they  show
that  whether  bailouts  occur  depend  partly  on  the  willingness  of  central  governments  to
offer them,  and  that  this  willingness depends  in part  on the  magnitude  of the  externalities
associated  with  local  public  good  provision.  They  also show, however, that  the  occurrence
of bailouts  is not only a matter  of the  central  government's  willingness to offer them  but  on
the  decision of localities  to accept  them.  Furthermore,  the  calculations  provide at  least  one
class of examples  where  there  is a clear  inverse relationship  between jurisdictional  size and
hardness  of budget  constraints.
V.  Conclusions  and  Directions  for  Future  Research
The  preceding  analysis  provides  a  number  of insights  into  the  problem  of soft  budget
constraints  and  bailouts  for lower-level governments.  The  analysis  begins  with  a recogni-
tion  that  interjurisdictional  externalities  can create  the  fundamental  incentive  for a central
government  to  intervene  in the  fiscal affairs of lower-level governments.  The  classical solu-
tion  to the efficiency problem  created  by interjurisdictional  externalities  is for a higher-level
government  to  offer  subsidies  to  localities  that  internalize  these  externalities.  Normally,
these  subsidies  entail  higher levels  of transfers  to jurisdictions  that  carry out  higher levels
of externality-producing  expenditures,  but one implication  of such  subsidy programs  is that
subsidies achieve their  minimal  values, which are zero in the  case of linear  subsidy schemes,
when local  expenditures  on externality-generating  activities  are  zero. The problem  is that  a
central  government,  acting  in the  interest  of the  rest of the  society  and facing a locality that
has chosen a very low level of local public  expenditures,  may have an incentive  to intervene
after  all to support  a base level of provision of local public goods that  produce  externalities.
A locality, anticipating  this  response,  may  choose to underprovide  local  public  goods  even
when offered a system  of corrective  transfers  that  would otherwise  appear  to provide exactly
the  right  incentive  to make socially-efficient public  expenditure  decisions.
One implication  of the  analysis  is that  a locality  that  finds it  advantageous  to  under-
25provide  local  public  goods in order  to  induce  a bailout  will not just  reduce  its  public  good
provision  by a small  amount  but  rather  will deviate  discretely  from  the  optimal  level. This
discrete  deviation  is attributable  to the  hypothesized  loss of local control  that  accompanies
a bailout,  represented  in the  model by  the  assumption  that  the  central  government,  when
bailing  out  a  locality,  only  takes  into  account  the  benefits  and  costs  of local  public  good
provision  that  accrue to  the  rest  of society.  This  shift  of control  over local  expenditures  to
an  outside  agency makes a bailout  a discrete  event,  and  the  loss of local  control  can only be
advantageous  to a locality  if it receives a discretely  higher level of transfers  from the  center
than  it would at  the  socially-efficient level of local  spending.  Depending  on the  precise form
of preferences,  the  best  course  of action  for a locality  that  intends  to induce  a  bailout  may
be to let  local expenditures  on externality-producing  activities  collapse entirely.
The  conditions  under  which  bailouts  occur  are  intuitively  clear:  if the  level  of local
expenditures  selected by a central government  under  a bailout  is "close" to the  level that  the
locality would choose at a social optimum,  then  there is not much cost imposed on the locality
from  the loss of control over local spending  levels relative to the gain from having  the central
government  finance  the  totality  of local  public  good  provision.  Specifying these  conditions
formally  is difficult because they  involve the  interplay  of preferences  between  local and  non-
local  beneficiaries  of local  public  goods.  With  mild  restrictions  on  preferences,  however,
it can  be shown  that  bailouts  definitely  do not occur  when  localities  are  sufficiently small,
whereas they  may - and,  as calculations  show, do - occur when localities are relatively  large.
Thus,  the  analysis  suggests  that  rather  than  contributing  to soft  local  budget  constraints,
fiscal decentralization  actually  can make budget  constraints  harder.  If localities  are found  to
pursue fiscal policies that  induce bailouts,  the  analysis suggests  that  the  problem  is not  that
the  public  sector  is too  decentralized,  but  rather  that  it  is too  centralized.  At least  within
the  context  of the  model,  institutional  reforms  that  move the  organization  of  the  public
sector  in the  direction  of greater  centralization  may worsen  rather  ameliorate  the  problem
of soft  local government  budget  constraints.
Indeed,  as the  opening  quotations  suggest,  there  do seem to  be real-world  examples  of
cases where large localities  are viewed as  "too big" to fail and where they pursue fiscal policies
that  do in fact induce interventions  by higher-level governments.  The cases of New York City
and of the  states  of Sao Paulo and  Rio de Janeiro  are also consistent  with  the  basic message
of the  model.  17  The case of Washington,  DC, provides  an example  where not only size, per
17  Hillbrecht  (1995) identifies  state-owned  banks  in Brazil  as  an  obstacle  to  hard  state
budget  constraints  and  to monetary  and  fiscal discipline,  developing  a theoretical  model  in
which  individual  states  have  the  ability  to  add  to the  monetary  base  and  thus  to  increase
the  economy-wide  rate  of inflation.  (This  specification  is a  condensed  representation  of a
complex  sequence of policies,  discussed  briefly in Section I, whereby  the  central  bank  ends
up  absorbing  and  monetizing  the  bad  debts  of state  banks  whose major  assets  are the  non-
performing  debt  of the  state  governments  that  own them.)  In this model, the inflation  rate  is
a kind of common-property  resource:  each state  bears the costs of inflation engendered  by the
expansionary  policies of other states.  All states  expand the money supply in order to capture
seignorage,  resulting  in socially-excessive inflation.  While  this  model  provides  a  convincing
explanation  for how decentralized  monetary  policy  (multiple  money-creating  banks)  could
26se, but  the  externalities  that  the  city generates  as the  seat  of the  central  government  are
likely to result  in bailouts  and  controls.  A recent  study  by Ades and  Glaeser  (1995) argues
that  the  "urban  giants"  of  the  developing  countries  are  likely to  attract  disproportionate
levels  of resources  from  central  governments  because  of political  factors;  while  that  study
does  not  specifically  address  the  organizational  form  of local  governance  or  the  nature  of
intergovernmental  fiscal relations,  its  findings  are  also  broadly  consistent  with  the  results
developed  above.  In research  on the  issues of monetary  unification  in the  European  Union,
McKinnon  (1995, 1996) has  drawn attention  to excessive borrowing by national  governments
as an obstacle  to monetary  union.  In this  context, he has compared  the borrowing of US state
and  local governments  with borrowing by provincial governments  in Canada,  noting that  the
amount  of outstanding  debt per capita  in the latter  is considerably  higher than  in the former.
It is relevant  to note  here that  Ontario  and Quebec,  which each account for about  25% of the
population  and  income  of Canada,  have particularly  high levels of indebtedness  per capita.
McKinnon  argues  that  since most  state  and local  debt  in the US is domestically  held  (owing
to special Federal income tax  provisions), it is easier for the U.S. federal government  to ignore
bankruptcies  in  any  one state  or locality,  i.e., no bailout,  because  such  a  bankruptcy  does
not impair  the  country's  international  credit rating  and,  possibly, the  credit standing  of the
other  states"  (McKinnon  [1996, p.  10]).  He argues  that  the  Canadian  federal  government
would be more likley to intervene  in case of a major  provincial default  because  "the provinces
borrow heavily  overseas in foreign currencies  as well as from  a variety  of domestic  financial
institutions"  and because  "contagion effects among foreign lenders  ...  could impair  Canada's
international  credit  standing."  This  is an  interesting  example  of an  externality  argument
associated  with  international  capital  markets.  18
result  in excessive  inflation,  it  also suggests  that  "big"  states  - those  containing  a  large
fraction  of population  or  of economic activity  - would be  less likely to engage  in excessive
monetary  growth  than  small  ones, since,  by virtue  of their  size, they  are  not  able to  "free
ride"  as easily  as small states.  (The  social  costs of inflation  generated  by monetary  growth
in small  states  fall more  heavily  on  outsiders  than  is the  case for large  states.)  Indeed,  it
implies  that  the  equilibrium  rate  of inflation  rises  as the  number  of states  rises,  i.e., as the
extent  of decentralization  increases.  While  understandable  within  the  context  of the  model,
this  finding  fails to  reflect the  fact  that  it is the  large Brazilian  states,  not  the  small  ones,
that  face  the  softest  budget  constraints;  as  Hillbrecht  (1995, p.  29)  puts  it,  "Sao  Paulo,
Rio  de Janeiro,  Minas Gerais,  and  Rio  Grande  do Sul,  ...  the  most  important  states,  both
politically  and  economically,  ...  can  transfer  their  debts  to  the  federal  government  more
easily  than  small,  less influential  states."  The  foregoing analysis  may  help  to explain  why
large  (or "more important")  subnational  units  face soft budget  constraints  while small ones
do not.
18 Of course, state  constitutional  prohibitions  on borrowing  and  other  institutional  con-
straints  may  account  for relatively  low levels of state/local  indebtedness  in the  US, as  dis-
cussed, for example,  by von Hagen  (1991) and  Poterba  (1994). This  observation  is certainly
consistent,  however,  with  the  notion  that  externalities  and  size contribute  to  soft  budget
constraints;  folowing  McKinnon's  observations,  one  could  argue  that  in  the  US case,  the
residents  of US states  have  chosen to create  institutions  (such  as constitutional  rules) that
limit  borrowing  because  they  anticipate  adverse  consequences  associated  with  it,  whereas
this  is not  so in the  Canadian  case.  Bruce  (1995) presents  a recent  analysis  of borrowing
by lower-level governments,  suggesting  that  household  mobility  - and  thus,  the  prospect  of
escaping  future  tax  burdens  - may be  partly  responsible  for excessive provincial  borrowing
in Canada,  an  argument  reminiscent  of analyses  of municipal  pension  underfunding  in the
US (e.g.,  Epple  and  Schipper  [1981], Inman  [1981]).
27Of course, one  must  proceed  with  caution  in attempting  to  use a  deliberately  stylized
theoretical  model  as  a  guide  to empirical  or  policy  analysis.  Some of  the  simplifying  as-
sumptions  exploited  in the  foregoing  analysis have been  introduced  mainly for expositional
convenience  and  could  be  relaxed  without  changing  the  major  results,  whereas  others  are
more  critical.  The  strong  symmetry  assumptions  of  the  model,  including  the  assumption
that  each  locality  is inhabited  by  identical  individuals,  greatly  simplify  the  notation  and
formal  analysis  but  the  basic insights  do  not  depend  on them  in a  fundamental  way.  Of
course, one  implication  of symmetry  is that  if it is in the  interest  of any  one locality  to  act
in a way that  induces  a bailout,  it is in the  interest  of all.  Interpreted  literally,  this  would
mean  that  either  all  localities  underprovide  the  local  public  good  and  become  subject  to
central  government  intervention  or that  none  of them  do.  In the  former  case, the  foregoing
analysis  does not correctly predict  the true equilibrium  of the system  since it postulates  that
each locality  assumes  that  all others  adhere to the  socially-optimal  policies that  they  would
follow if they  could  not be bailed  out.  This  assumption  is appropriate  for characterizing  an
equilibrium  when budget  constraints  are  in fact  hard,  since then  no jurisdiction  finds it in
its  interest  to deviate  from  its hard-budget  equilibrium  policies.  If instead  any one  locality
does choose to induce a bailout,  then  others  would also choose to do so; the characterization
of a Nash equilibrium  would then  entail  a simultaneous  determination  of best  replies in the
presence of bailouts.  The present  analysis  does not do this,  and  it cannot  therefore  be  prop-
erly interpreted  as  an model  of equilibrium  under  soft budget  constraints.  It  can,  however,
be used  to  ascertain  when the  first-best  allocation  under  hard  budget  constraints  is in fact
an  equilibrium  and  when  that  allocation  will break  down;  one  might  say  that  it  provides
model of the  breakdown  of equilibrium  but not  an  equilibrium  model of breakdown.
Actually,  the  problem  o0 simultaneous  deviation  from  hard  budget  constraints  by  all
localities  is more of  an  artifact  of the  strong  symmetry  assumptions  of the  model  than  a
problem  of intrinsic  interest.  Suppose  that  the  economy contains  many  localities  of differ-
ent  sizes  and  that  there  are  localities  in  each size class  with  preferences,  endowments,  or
technologies that  make them  more or less likely to act  in such  a way as to induce  bailouts.
Although  a  complete  formal analysis  of such a  model would be  more involved in its  details
than  that  presented  above, this would not change the essential  incentives that  would or would
not  give rise to  soft budget  constraints  for any  one size/preference/endowment/technology
type  of locality.  One can thus visualize  a model in which only a small number  of localities,
corresponding  to particular  types  (e.g., the  largest ones, or those with  preferences and  other
attributes  that  make  departures  from  local  control  of public  good provision relatively  pain-
less for local  residents)  end  up  being  bailed  out  while  no bailouts  occur  in  the  rest  of the
system.  In such  an economy, the  problem  of modelling the  simultaneous  breakdown  of hard
budget  constraints  for all localities  would disappear  and  the  analysis  would be rather  close
to that  developed  above,  which could then  be interpreted  approximately  as a description  of
what  happens  to the  localities  within any  one class.
The  analysis  has  deliberately  abstracted  from  technological  considerations  that  might
28favor larger or smaller jurisdiction  sizes. Economies of scale are of obvious importance  for the
efficient provision  of local  public  goods and  must  be taken  into  account  in determining  the
optimal  degree  of fiscal decentralization.  (A closely related  question,  which  may  be  posed
either  in  normative  or  positive  terms,  concerns  the  assignment  of  functions  to  different
levels of government.)  One interpretation  of the  analysis is that  there may be organizational
diseconomies  of scale,  in the  form  of soft budget  constraints  and  the  inefficient  incentives
that  they  create,  that  must  in practice  be balanced  against  technological  economies of scale
in  local  public  good  provision.  Theoretical  and  empirical  study  of this  tradeoff  presents
an  interesting  question  for further  research.  For instance,  one  might  suppose  that  fiscal
decentralization  that  appears  to  be  excessive  on purely  technological  grounds  might  still
be  attractive  if it  leads to  harder  budget  constraints  and  the  accompanying  sharpening  of
incentives that  they  entail.  By the same token, if technological economies make it impossible
to  decentralize  specific  public  sector  functions  sufficiently to  avoid soft  budget  constraints,
then  perhaps  central  government  control  would be  preferable  to  an  imperfect  and  poorly
functioning  partial  decentralization;  indeed,  since  bailouts  in  the  present  model  involve
central  government  financing and  control  of local public good provision,  they  may  be taken,
loosely, to represent  (re)centralization  of government  functions.
As indicated  in the  introduction,  many  factors  are simultaneously  at  work in real local
fiscal crises,  and  any  attempt  to  explain  empirical  reality  or  to  formulate  policy  implica-
tions  in specific  cases would have to  incorporate  considerations  that  go beyond  the  simple
analysis  presented  here.  For example,  a static  model does  not  capture  those  aspects  of in-
tergovernmental  fiscal that  reflect the  ongoing relationships  between  higher- and  lower-level
governments.  The  prospect  of  repeated  failures  by  a lower-level government  to  adhere  to
its budget  constraint,  accompanied  by repeated  interventions  by a higher-level  government,
is one  that  both  parties  might  view  rather  differently  than  the  one-shot  failures  described
here.  An  analysis  that  explicitly  incorporates  dynamic  interactions  between  governments
need not,  however, overturn  the  basic conclusions derived here; rather,  it would complement
the  present  analysis  by shedding  light  on rather  different  aspects  of intergovernmental  fiscal
relations.  Similarly,  one  could  develop  a model  in which  localities  are  subject  to  random
shocks  of various  kinds,  such  that  only those  localities  with  particular  shocks  (e.g.,  poor
endowment  realizations)  end up  choosing to induce bailouts.  As discussed  above in relation
to  the  symmetry  assumptions  of the  model, allowing for such  diversity  among  localities  is
not  likely to overturn  the  basic  conclusions  of the  analysis  though  it may  complicate  them
in detail.  In brief, extensions  of the  analysis to incorporate  uncertainty  or explicit  dynamics
would complement  it in valuable  ways but  would not  negate  its  principal  findings.
In practice,  one way to avoid problems  of bailouts  is to make it less attractive  for local-
ities to induce them.  This  can be  done by making  "receivership"  less attractive,  for example
by defining  standards  of fiscal responsibility  and  holding local  officials personally  liable  for
failure  to  meet  them.  (For  example,  a  mayor  who  diverts  public  funds  to  contracts  for
influential  friends  could  be jailed.)  These  standards  are  difficult to  define,  however.  (One
29may  not want  to impose criminal  penalties  on a mayor who provides  generous  pension  ben-
efits  to workers  who are  members  in influential  unions,  for instance,  even though  excessive
compensation  for politically-powerful  municipal  employees could be  viewed as a diversion  of
funds  from  local  uses that  generate  external  benefits.)  Alternatively,  the  center  could offer
matching  grants  on more  favorable  terms,  raising  the  matching  rate  above  the  first-best
efficient level of  m*.  Although  this  may  create  a  distortion  by  inducing  over-provision  of
local public  goods,  it also makes  bailouts  less attractive  to localities.  Since equilibria  with
bailouts  are  also  inefficient, excessively  generous  matching  grants  may  be  welfare-superior
to matching  grants  set  at  first-best  rates.  This  presents  a subtle  second-best  problem  that
may warrant  further  study.  A related  issue concerns  the normative  and  positive  economics
of the  "assignment  problem,"  that  is,  the  problem  of  deciding  which  levels of government
in a multi-level  public  sector  should  take  responsibility  for various  public-sector  functions.
If there  are  economies  of scale  that  necessitate  provision  of  certain  public  goods  by  large
jurisdictions,  there  may  be  no effective mechanism  for a  central  government  to harden  the
budget  constraints  of necessarily  large  lower-level governments,  so  that  bailouts,  and  the
welfare losses associated  with  them,  are  an  unavoidable  consequence  of fiscal decentraliza-
tion.  Public  goods  for  which  this  is  the  case may  ones  which  are  or  should  be  provided
by  central  governments,  since it  would be  impossible  to  create  the  right  incentives  for ef-
ficient decentralized  provision.  Depending  on economies of scale and  the  nature  of benefit
spillovers,  other  public  sector  functions  could be  efficiently provided  by lower-level govern-
ments  supported  by  appropriate  corrective  intergovernmental  grants,  and  therefore  would
or should  be provided  in a decentralized  fashion.
Finally,  as noted  in Section  I, problems  of fiscal discipline and  soft  budget  constraints
are  not, unique  to subnatiornal  governments;  the  concept  originated  in the  work of Kornai
on state-owned  enterprises  in socialist  economies.  Quite  outside  the  context  of the  planned
economies,  governments  occasionally  bail  out  particular  industries  or even individual  firms
(e.g.,  debt  restructurings  worked  out  with  major  banks,  the  Chrysler  bail  out).  On  the
international  level, foreign-aid  donors,  acting  unilaterally  or  perhaps  through  multilateral
agencies  such  as  the  IMF  or  World Bank,  sometimes  make  extraordinary  interventions  in
order  to  bail  out  recipient  governments.  19  Within  the  local  public  sector,  governments
must  allocate  fiscal resources  across  competing  functional  units  and  there  are  sometimes
crises  in  particular  departments  or  agencies  (the  police  department,  the  water  company,
etc.)  that  attract  unanticipated  budgetary  flows, perhaps  in the process upsetting  the overall
management  of the  budgetary  mechanism  (see, e.g.,  Carlsen  [1996] for a  typical  case).  In
these  and  other  cases, it is interesting  to ask  why some recipients  are  selected  for bailouts
while others  are not.  The foregoing analysis  suggests that  the  magnitude  of the  externalities
19 See Eaton  et  al.  1986 and  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff (1996) for discussions  of sovreign bor-
rowing  and  country  risk, and  for references to a the  large literature  on this  subject.  A focus
of  many  analyses  of sovreign  debt  concerns  the  mechanism  of contract  enforcement;  the
present  analysis,  by emphasizing  external  effects, does  not contradict  but  may  complement
some of the findings in that  literature,  in particular  by helping to explain why some countries
may  be  the  objects  of sustained  assistance  by donor/lender  countries  while others  are not.
30generated  by  local  failures  may  be  a  principal  determinant  of the  willingness of potential
donors  to intervene  with special  transfers.
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